Despite much study, the computational complexity of differential privacy remains poorly understood. In this paper we consider the computational complexity of accurately answering a family Q of statistical queries over a data universe X under differential privacy. A statistical query on a dataset D ∈ X n asks "what fraction of the elements of D satisfy a given predicate p on X?" Dwork et al. (STOC'09) and Boneh and Zhandry (CRYPTO'14) showed that if both Q and X are of polynomial size, then there is an efficient differentially private algorithm that accurately answers all the queries, and if both Q and X are exponential size, then under a plausible assumption, no efficient algorithm exists.
1. For every n, there is a family Q ofÕ(n 7 ) queries on a data universe X of size 2 d such that no poly(n, d) time differentially private algorithm takes a dataset D ∈ X n and outputs accurate answers to every query in Q.
2. For every n, there is a family Q of 2 d queries on a data universe X of sizeÕ(n 7 ) such that no poly(n, d) time differentially private algorithm takes a dataset D ∈ X n and outputs accurate answers to every query in Q.
In both cases, the result is nearly quantitatively tight, since there is an efficient differentially private algorithm that answersΩ(n 2 ) queries on an exponential size data universe, and one that answers exponentially many queries on a data universe of sizeΩ(n 2 ).
Our proofs build on the connection between hardness results in differential privacy and traitor-tracing schemes (Dwork et al., STOC'09; Ullman, STOC'13). We prove our hardness result for a polynomial size query set (resp., data universe) by showing that they follow from the existence of a special type of traitor-tracing scheme with very short ciphertexts (resp., secret keys), but very weak security guarantees, and then constructing such a scheme.
Introduction
The goal of privacy-preserving data analysis is to release rich statistical information about a sensitive dataset while respecting the privacy of the individuals represented in that dataset. The past decade has seen tremendous progress towards understanding when and how these two competing goals can be reconciled, including surprisingly powerful differentially private algorithms as well as computational and information-theoretic limitations. In this work, we further this agenda by showing a strong new computational bottleneck in differential privacy.
Consider a dataset D ∈ X n where each of the n elements is one individual's data, and each individual's data comes from some data universe X. We would like to be able to answer sets of statistical queries on D, which are queries of the form "What fraction of the individuals in D satisfy some property p?" However, differential privacy [DMNS06] requires that we do so in such a way that no individual's data has significant influence on the answers.
If we are content answering a relatively small set of queries Q, then it suffices to perturb the answer to each query with independent noise from an appropriate distribution. This algorithm is simple, very efficient, differentially private, and ensures good accuracy-say, within ±.01 of the true answer-as long as |Q| n 2 queries [DN03, DN04, BDMN05, DMNS06] .
Remarkably, the work of Blum, Ligett, and Roth [BLR13] showed that it is possible to output a summary that allows accurate answers to an exponential number of queries-nearly 2 n -while ensuring differential privacy. However, neither their algorithm nor the subsequent improvements [DNR + 09, DRV10, RR10, HR10, GRU12, NTZ13, Ull15] are computationally efficient. Specifically, they all require time at least poly(n, |X|, |Q|) to privately and accurately answer a family of statistical queries Q on a dataset D ∈ X n . Note that the size of the input is n log |X| bits, so a computationally efficient algorithm runs in time poly(n, log |X|). 1 For example, in the common setting where each individual's data consists of d binary attributes, namely X = {0, 1} d , the size of the input is nd but |X| = 2 d . As a result, all known private algorithms for answering arbitrary sets of statistical queries are inefficient if either the number of queries or the size of the data universe is superpolynomial.
This accuracy vs. computation tradeoff has been the subject of extensive study. Dwork et al. [DNR + 09] showed that the existence of cryptographic traitor-tracing schemes [CFN94] yields a family of statistical queries that cannot be answered accurately and efficiently with differential privacy. Applying recent traitor-tracing schemes [BZ14] , we conclude that, under plausible cryptographic assumptions (discussed below), if both the number of queries and the data universe can be superpolynomial, then there is no efficient differentially private algorithm.
[Ull13] used variants of traitor-tracing schemes to show that in the interactive setting, where the queries are not fixed but are instead given as input to the algorithm, assuming one-way functions exist, there is no private and efficient algorithm that accurately answers more thañ O(n 2 ) statistical queries. All of the algorithms mentioned above work in this interactive setting, but for many applications we only need to answer a fixed family of statistical queries.
Despite the substantial progress, there is still a basic gap in our understanding. The hardness results for Dwork et al. apply if both the number of queries and the universe are large. But the known algorithms require exponential time if either of these sets is large. Is this necessary? Are there algorithms that run in time poly(n, log |X|, |Q|) or poly(n, |X|, log |Q|)?
Our main result shows that under the same plausible cryptographic assumptions, the answer is no-if either the data universe or the set of queries can be superpolynomially large, then there is some family of statistical queries that cannot be accurately and efficiently answered while ensuring differential privacy.
Our Results
Our first result shows that if the data universe can be of superpolynomial size then there is some fixed family of polynomially many queries that cannot be efficiently answered under differential privacy. This result shows that the efficient algorithm for answering an arbitrary family of |Q| n 2 queries by adding independent noise is optimal up to the specific constant in the exponent. Our second result shows that, even if the data universe is required to be of polynomial size, there is a fixed set of superpolynomially many queries that cannot be answered efficiently under differential privacy. When we say that an algorithm efficiently answers a set of superpolynomially many queries, we mean that it efficiently outputs a summary such that there is an efficient algorithm for obtaining an accurate answer to any query in the set. For comparison, if |X| n 2 , then there is a simple poly(n, |X|) time differentially private algorithm that accurately answers superpolynomially many queries. 2 Our result shows that this efficient algorithm is optimal up to the specific constant in the exponent. Theorem 1.2 (Hardness for small query sets). Assume the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions. Let λ ∈ N be a computation parameter. For any polynomial n = n(λ), there is a sequence of pairs {(X λ , Q λ )} with |X λ | =Õ(n 7 ) and |Q λ | = 2 λ such that there is no polynomial time differentially private algorithm that takes a dataset D ∈ X n λ and outputs an accurate answer to every query in Q λ up to an additive error of ±1/3.
Before we proceed to describe our techniques, we make a few remarks about these results. In both of these results, the constant 1/3 in our result is arbitrary, and can be replaced with any constant smaller than 1/2. We also remark that, when we informally say that an algorithm is differentially private, we mean that it satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy for some ε = O(1) and δ = o(1/n). These are effectively the largest parameters for which differential privacy is a meaningful notion of privacy. That our hardness results apply to these parameters only makes our results stronger. 2 The algorithm, sometimes called the noisy histogram algorithm, works as follows. First, convert the dataset D to a vector (D x ) x∈X where D x is the fraction of D's elements that are equal to x. Then, output a vectorD = (D x ) x∈X whereD x is equal to D x plus independent noise from an appropriately scaled Gaussian distribution. To answer a statistical query defined by a predicate p, construct the vectorp = (p(x)) x∈X and compute the answer D ,p . One can show that this algorithm is differentially private and for any fixed set of statistical queries Q, with high probability, the maximum error isÕ( |X| log |Q|/n). The running time is poly(n, |X|) to constructD and to evaluate each query.
On Indistinguishability Obfuscation. Indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) has recently become a central cryptographic primitive. The first candidate construction, proposed just a couple years ago [GGH + 13], was followed by a flurry of results demonstrating the extreme power and wide applicability of iO (cf., [GGH + 13, SW14, BZ14, HSW14, BPW16]). However, the assumption that iO exists is currently poorly understood, and the debate over the plausibility of iO is far from settled. While some specific proposed iO schemes have been attacked [CGH + 15, MSZ16], other schemes seem to resist all currently known attacks [BMSZ16, GMS16] . We also do not know how to base iO on a solid, simple, natural computational assumption (some attempts based on multilinear maps have been made [GLSW15] , but they were broken with respect to all current multilinear map constructions).
Nevertheless, our results are meaningful whether or not iO exists. If iO exists, our results show that certain tasks in differential privacy are intractable. Interestingly, unlike many previous results relying on iO, these conclusions were not previously known to follow from even the much stronger (and in fact, false) assumption of virtual black-box obfuscation. If, on the other hand, iO does not exist, then our results still demonstrate a barrier to progress in differential privacy-such progress would need to prove that iO does not exist. Alternatively, our results highlight a possible path toward proving that iO does not exist. We note that other "incompatibility" results are known for iO; for example, iO and certain types of hash functions cannot simultaneously exist [BFM14, BST16] .
Techniques
We prove our results by building on the connection between differentially private algorithms for answering statistical queries and traitor-tracing schemes discovered by Dwork et al. [DNR + 09]. Traitor-tracing schemes were introduced by Chor, Fiat, and Naor [CFN94] for the purpose of identifying pirates who violate copyright restrictions. Roughly speaking, a (fully collusionresilient) traitor-tracing scheme allows a sender to generate keys for n users so that 1) the sender can broadcast encrypted messages that can be decrypted by any user, and 2) any efficient pirate decoder capable of decrypting messages can be traced to at least one of the users who contributed a key to it, even if an arbitrary coalition of the users combined their keys in an arbitrary efficient manner to construct the decoder. Dwork et al. show that the existence of traitor-tracing schemes implies hardness results for differential privacy. Very informally, they argue as follows. Suppose a coalition of users takes their keys and builds a dataset D ∈ X n where each element of the dataset contains one of their user keys. The family Q will contain a query q c for each possible ciphertext c. The query q c asks "What fraction of the elements (user keys) in D would decrypt the ciphertext c to the message 1?" Every user can decrypt, so if the sender encrypts a message b ∈ {0, 1} as a ciphertext c, then every user will decrypt c to b. Thus, the answer to the statistical query q c will be b.
Suppose there were an efficient algorithm that outputs an accurate answer to each query q c in Q. Then the coalition could use it to efficiently produce a summary of the dataset D that enables one to efficiently compute an approximate answer to every query q c , which would also allow one to efficiently decrypt the ciphertext. Such a summary can be viewed as an efficient pirate decoder, and thus the tracing algorithm can use the summary to trace one of the users in the coalition. However, if there is a way to identify one of the users in the dataset from the summary, then the summary is not differentially private.
To instantiate this result, they need a traitor-tracing scheme. Observe that the data universe contains one element for every possible user key, and the set of queries contains one query for every ciphertext, and we want to minimize the size of these sets. Boneh and Zhandry constructed a traitor-tracing scheme where both the keys and the ciphertexts have length equal to the security parameter λ, which yields hardness for a data universe and query set each of size 2 λ . The main contribution of this work is to show that we can reduce either the number of possible ciphertexts or the number of possible keys to poly(n) while the other remains of size 2 λ .
Suppose we want to reduce the number of possible ciphertexts to poly(n). How can we possibly have a secure traitor-tracing scheme with only polynomially many ciphertexts, when even a semantically secure private key encryption scheme requires superpolynomially many ciphertexts? The answer lies in an observation from [Ull13] that in order to show hardness for differential privacy, it suffices to have a traitor-tracing scheme with extremely weak security. First, in the reduction from differential privacy to breaking traitor-tracing the adversary has to produce the pirate decoder using only the coalition's user keys and does not have access to an encryption oracle. Second, the probability that tracing fails only needs to be o(1/n), rather than negligible. Both of these relaxations of the standard definition of traitor-tracing are crucial to making the ciphertext size poly(n), and as we show, these two relaxations are in fact sufficient. Alternatively, we can use these relaxations also allow us to reduce the key size to poly(n). We defer the reader to the constructions of Sections 6 and 7 for more details about how we achieve this goal.
Related Work
Theorem 1.1 should be contrasted with the line of work on answering width-w marginal queries under differential privacy [GHRU13, HRS12, TUV12, CTUW14, DNT14]. A width-w marginal query is defined on the data universe {0, 1} λ . It is specified by a set of positions S ⊆ {1, . . . , λ} of size w, and a pattern t ∈ {0, 1} w and asks "What fraction of elements of the dataset have each coordinate j ∈ S set to t j ?" Specifically, Thaler, Ullman, and Vadhan [TUV12], building on the work of Hardt, Rothblum, and Servedio [HRS12] gave an efficient differentially private algorithm for answering n Ω(
n 7 width-w marginal queries up to an additive error of ±.01. There are also computationally efficient algorithms that answer exponentially many queries from even simpler families like point queries and threshold queries [BNS13, BNSV15] .
There have been several other attempts to explain the accuracy vs. computation tradeoff in differential privacy by considering restricted classes of algorithms. For example, Ullman and Vadhan [UV11] (building on Dwork et al. [DNR + 09]) show that, assuming one-way functions, no differentially private and computationally efficient algorithm that outputs a synthetic dataset can accurately answer even the very simple family of 2-way marginals. This result is incomparable to ours, since it applies to a very small and simple family of statistical queries, but necessarily only applies to algorithms that output synthetic data.
Gupta et al. [GHRU13] showed that no algorithm can obtain accurate answers to all marginal queries just by asking a polynomial number of statistical queries on the dataset. Thus, any algorithm that can be implemented using only statistical queries, even one that is not differentially private, can run in polynomial time.
Bun and Zhandry considered the incomparable problem of differentially private PAC learning [BZ16] [HU14, SU15b] . The technical core of these results is to show that if an adversary is allowed to ask an online sequence of adaptively chosen statistical queries, then he can not only recover one element of the dataset, but can actually recover every element of the dataset. Doing so rules out any reasonable notion of privacy, and makes many non-private learning tasks impossible. The results are proven using variants of the sorts of traitor-tracing schemes that we study in this work.
Differential Privacy Preliminaries

Differentially Private Algorithms
A dataset D ∈ X n is an ordered set of n rows, where each row corresponds to an individual, and each row is an element of some the data universe X. Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06] ). Let A : X n → S be a randomized algorithm. We say that A is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for every two adjacent datasets D ∼ D and every subset T ⊆ S,
In this definition, ε, δ may be a function of n.
Algorithms for Answering Statistical Queries
In this work we study algorithms that answer statistical queries (which are also sometimes called counting queries, predicate queries, or linear queries in the literature). For a data universe X, a statistical query on X is defined by a predicate q : X → {0, 1}. Abusing notation, we define the evaluation of a query q on a dataset
A single statistical query does not provide much useful information about the dataset. However, a sufficiently large and rich set of statistical queries is sufficient to implement many natural machine learning and data mining algorithms [Kea98] , thus we are interesting in differentially private algorithms to answer such sets. To this end, let Q = {q : X → {0, 1}} be a set of statistical queries on a data universe X.
Informally, we say that a mechanism is accurate for a set Q of statistical queries if it answers every query in the family to within error ±α for some suitable choice of α > 0. Note that 0 ≤ q(D) ≤ 1, so this definition of accuracy is meaningful when α < 1/2.
Before we define accuracy, we note that the mechanism may represent its answer in any form. That is, the mechanism outputs may output a summary S ∈ S that somehow represents the answers to every query in Q. We then require that there is an evaluator Eval : S × Q → [0, 1] that takes the summary and a query and outputs an approximate answer to that query. That is, we think of Eval(S, q) as the mechanism's answer to the query q. We will abuse notation and simply write q(S) to mean Eval(S, q). 3 Definition 2.2 (Accuracy). For a family Q of statistical queries on X, a dataset D ∈ X n and a summary s ∈ S, we say that s is α-accurate for Q on D if
For a family of statistical queries Q on X, we say that an algorithm A :
In this work we are typically interested in mechanisms that satisfy the very weak notion of (1/3, o(1/n))-accuracy, where the constant 1/3 could be replaced with any constant < 1/2. Most differentially private mechanisms satisfy quantitatively much stronger accuracy guarantees. Since we are proving hardness results, this choice of parameters makes our results stronger.
Computational Efficiency
Since we are interested in asymptotic efficiency, we introduce a computation parameter λ ∈ N. We then consider a sequence of pairs {(X λ , Q λ )} λ∈N where Q λ is a set of statistical queries on X λ . We consider databases of size n where n = n(λ) is a polynomial. We then consider algorithms A that take as input a dataset X n λ and output a summary in S λ where {S λ } λ∈N is a sequence of output ranges. There is an associated evaluator Eval that takes a query q ∈ Q λ and a summary s ∈ S λ and outputs a real-valued answer. The definitions of differential privacy and accuracy extend straightforwardly to such sequences.
We say that such an algorithm is computationally efficient if the running time of the algorithm and the associated evaluator run in time polynomial in the computation parameter λ. 4 We remark that in principle, it could require at many as |X| bits even to specify a statistical query, in which case we cannot hope to answer the query efficiently, even ignoring privacy constraints. In this work we restrict attention exclusively to statistical queries that are specified by a circuit of size poly(log |X|), and thus can be evaluated in time poly(log |X|), and so are not the bottleneck in computation. To remind the reader of this fact, we will often say that Q is a family of efficiently computable statistical queries.
Notational Conventions
Given a boolean predicate p, we will write I{p} to denote the value 1 if p is true and 0 if p is false. Also, given a vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ X n and an index i ∈ [n], we will use v −i to denote the vector
. . , v n ) ∈ X n in which the i-th element of v is replaced by some unspecified fixed element of X denoted ⊥. We also say that a function f is negligible, and write
Weakly Secure Traitor-Tracing Schemes
In this section we describe a very relaxed notion of traitor-tracing schemes whose existence will imply the hardness of differentially private data release.
Syntax and Correctness
For a function n : N → N and a sequence {K λ , C λ } λ∈N , an (n, {K λ , C λ })-traitor-tracing scheme is a tuple of efficient algorithms Π = (Setup, Enc, Dec) with the following syntax.
• Setup takes as input a security parameter λ, runs in time poly(λ), and outputs n = n(λ) secret user keys sk 1 , . . . , sk n ∈ K λ and a secret master key mk. We will write k = (sk 1 , . . . , sk n , mk) to denote the set of keys.
• Enc takes as input a master key mk and an index i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C λ . If c ← R Enc(j, mk) then we say that c is encrypted to index j.
• Dec takes as input a ciphertext c and a user key sk i and outputs a single bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We assume for simplicity that Dec is deterministic.
Correctness of the scheme asserts that if k are generated by Setup, then for any pair i, j, Dec(sk i , Enc(mk, j)) = I{i ≤ j}. For simplicity, we require that this property holds with probability 1 over the coins of Setup and Enc, although it would not affect our results substantively if we required only correctness with high probability.
Definition 3.1 (Perfect Correctness). An (n, {K λ , C λ })-traitor-tracing scheme is perfectly correct if for every λ ∈ N, and every i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}
Index-Hiding Security
Intuitively, the security property we want is that any computationally efficient adversary who is missing one of the user keys sk i * cannot distinguish ciphertexts encrypted with index i * from index i * − 1, even if that adversary holds all n − 1 other keys sk −i * . In other words, an efficient adversary cannot infer anything about the encrypted index beyond what is implied by the correctness of decryption and the set of keys he holds.
More precisely, consider the following two-phase experiment. First the adversary is given every key except for sk i * , and outputs a decryption program S. Then, a challenge ciphertext is encrypted to either i * or to i * − 1. We say that the traitor-tracing scheme is secure if for every polynomial time adversary, with high probability over the setup and the decryption program chosen by the adversary, the decryption program has small advantage in distinguishing the two possible indices.
Definition 3.2 (Index Hiding). A traitor-tracing scheme Π satisfies (weak) index-hiding security if for every sufficiently large λ ∈ N, every i * ∈ [n(λ)], and every adversary A with running time poly(λ),
In the above, the inner probabilities are taken over the coins of Enc and S.
Note that in the above definition we have fixed the success probability of the adversary for simplicity. Moreover, we have fixed these probabilities to relatively large ones. Requiring only a polynomially small advantage is crucial to achieving the key and ciphertext lengths we need to obtain our results, while still being sufficient to establish the hardness of differential privacy.
The Index-Hiding and Two-Index-Hiding Games
While Definition 3.2 is the most natural, in this section we consider some related ways of defining security that will be easier to work with when we construct and analyze our schemes. Consider the following IndexHiding game. 
The challenger generates keys
Then the following is equivalent to (1) in Definition 3.2 as
In order to prove that our schemes satisfy weak index-hiding security, we will go through an intermediate notion that we call two-index-hiding security. To see why this is useful, In our constructions it will be fairly easy to prove that Adv[i * ] is small, but because Adv[i * , k, S] can be positive or negative, that alone is not enough to establish (2). Thus, in order to establish (2) we will analyze the following variant of the index-hiding game.
The challenger generates keys k = (sk 1 , . . . , sk n , mk) ← R Setup. The adversary A is given keys sk −i * and outputs a decryption program S. Analogous to what we did with IndexHiding, we can define TwoIndexHiding[i * , k, S] to be the game TwoIndexHiding[i * ] where we fix the choices of k and S, and define
The crucial feature is that if we can bound the expectation of TwoAdv then we get a bound on the expectation of Adv 2 . Since Adv 2 is always positive, we can apply Markov's inequality to establish (2). Formally, we have the following claim.
Claim 3.3. Suppose that for every efficient adversary A, λ ∈ N, and index i * ∈ [n(λ)],
Then for every efficient adversary A, λ ∈ N, and index
Using this claim we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Let Π be a traitor-tracing scheme such that for every efficient adversary A, λ ∈ N, and index i * ∈ [n(λ)],
Then Π satisfies weak index-hiding security.
Proof. By applying Claim 3.3 to the assumption of the lemma, we have that for every efficient adversary A,
Now we have
To complete the proof, observe that this final condition is equivalent to the definition of weak index-hiding security (Definition 3.2).
In light of this lemma, we will focus on proving that the schemes we construct in the following sections satisfying the condition
which will be easier than directly establishing Definition 3.2.
Hardness of Differential Privacy from Traitor Tracing
In this section we prove that traitor-tracing scheme satisfying perfect correctness and indexhiding security yields a family of statistical queries that cannot be answered accurately by an efficient differentially private algorithm. The proof is a fairly straightforward adaptation of the proofs in Dwork et al. [DNR + 09] and Ullman [Ull13] that various sorts of traitor-tracing schemes imply hardness results for differential privacy. We include the result for completeness, and to verify that our very weak definition of traitor-tracing is sufficient to prove hardness of differential privacy. . We give the proof both for completeness and to verify that our definition of traitor-tracing suffices to establish the hardness of differential privacy.
Proof. Let Π = (Setup, Enc, Dec) be the promised (n, {K λ , C λ }) traitor-tracing scheme. For every λ ∈ N, we can define a distribution on datasets D ∈ X n(λ) λ as follows. Run Setup(λ) to obtain n = n(λ) secret user keys sk 1 , . . . , sk n ∈ K λ and a master secret key mk. Let the dataset be D = (sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) ∈ X n λ where we define the data universe X λ = K λ . Abusing notation, we'll write (D, mk) ← R Setup(λ).
Now we define the family of queries Q λ on X λ as follows. For every ciphertext c ∈ C λ , we define the predicate q c ∈ Q λ to take as input a user key sk i ∈ K λ and output Dec(sk i , c). That is,
Recall that, by the definition of a statistical query, for a dataset D = (sk 1 , . . . , sk n ), we have
Suppose there is an algorithm A that is computationally efficient and is (1/3, 1/2n)-accurate for Q λ given a dataset D ∈ X n λ . We will show that A cannot satisfy (1, 1/2n)-differential privacy. By accuracy, for every λ ∈ N and every fixed dataset D ∈ X n λ , with probability at least 1 − 1/2n, A(D) outputs a summary S ∈ S λ that is 1/3-accurate for Q λ on D. That is, for every D ∈ X n λ , with probability at least 1 − 1/2n,
Suppose that S is indeed 1/3-accurate. By perfect correctness of the traitor-tracing scheme (Definition 3.1), and the definition of Q, we have that since (D, mk) = Setup(λ),
Combining Equations (4) and (5), we have that if (D, mk) = Setup(λ), S ← R A(D), and S is 1/3-accurate, then we have both
Thus, for every (D, mk) and S that is 1/3-accurate, there exists an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
By averaging, using the fact that S is 1/3-accurate with probability at least 1 − 1/2n, there must exist an index i * ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
Assume, for the sake of contradiction that A is (1, 1/2n)-differentially private. For a given i, mk, let S i,mk ⊆ S λ be the set of summaries S such that (6) holds. Then, by (7), we have
By differential privacy of A, we have
Thus, by our definition of S i * ,mk , and by averaging over (D, mk) ← R Setup(λ), we have
But this violates the index hiding property of the traitor tracing scheme. Specifically, if we consider an adversary for the traitor tracing scheme that runs A on the keys sk −i * to obtain a summary S, then decrypts a ciphertext c by computing q c (S) and rounding the answer to {0, 1}, then by (8) this adversary violates index-hiding security (Definition 3.2).
Thus we have obtained a contradiction showing that A is not (1, 1/2n)-differentially private. This completes the proof.
Cryptographic Primitives
Standard Tools
We will make use of a few standard cryptographic and information-theoretic primitives. We will define these primitives for completeness and to set notation and terminology.
Almost Pairwise Independent Hash Families. A hash family is a family of functions H s = {h : [s] → {0, 1}}. To avoid notational clutter, we will use the notation h ← R H to denote the operation of choosing a random function from H and will not explicitly write the seed for the function. We will use |h| to denote the seed length for the function and require that h can be evaluated in time poly(|h|). 
For every s, there exists a pairwise independent hash family
In this definition, U b denotes the uniform distribution on {0, 1} b . Pseudorandom generators exist under the minimal assumption that one-way functions exist.
Pseudorandom Function Families. A pseudorandom function family is a family of functions
To avoid notational clutter, we will use the notation PRF ← R F λ to denote the operation of choosing a random function from F λ and not explicitly write the seed for the function. We will use |PRF| to denote the description length for the function. We require that |PRF| = poly(λ) and that PRF can be evaluated in time poly(|PRF|).
Security requires that oracle access to PRF ← R F λ is indistinguishable from oracle access to a random function. Specifically, for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms D,
for some negligible function . Under the minimal assumption that one-way functions exist, for every pair of functions m, n that are at most exponential, for every λ ∈ N, there is a family of pseudorandom functions
A pseudorandom function family is δ-almost pairwise independent for δ = negl(λ).
Puncturable Pseudorandom Functions
A pseudorandom function family 
The definition of security for a punctured pseudorandom function states that for any x * , given the punctured function PRF {x * } , the missing value PRF(x * ) is computationally unpredictable.
Specifically, we define the following game Puncture to capture the desired security property.
The challenger chooses PRF ← R F λ The challenger chooses uniform random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and samples
The challenger punctures PRF at x * , obtaining PRF {x * } .
The adversary is given (y b , PRF {x * } ) and outputs a bit b . 
Twice Puncturable PRFs
A twice puncturable PRF is a pair of algorithms (PRFSetup, Puncture).
• PRFSetup is a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter λ and outputs a function PRF : [m] → [n] where m = m(λ) and n = n(λ) are parameters of the construction. Technically, the function is parameterized by a seed of length λ, however for notational simplicity we will ignore the seed and simply use PRF to denote this function. Formally PRF ← R PRFSetup(λ).
• Puncture is a deterministic algorithm that takes a PRF and a pair of inputs x 0 , x 1 ∈ [m] and outputs a new function
In what follows we will always assume that m and n are polynomial in the security parameter and that m = ω(n log(n)).
In addition to requiring that this family of functions satisfies the standard notion of cryptographic pseudorandomness, we will now define a new security property for twice puncturable PRFs, called input matching indistinguishability. For any two distinct outputs y 0 , y 1 ∈ [n], y 0 y 1 , consider the following game.
The challenger chooses PRF such that ∀y ∈ [n], PRF −1 (y) ∅. The challenger chooses independent random bits b 0 , b 1 ∈ {0, 1}, and samples
The challenger punctures PRF at x 0 , x 1 , obtaining PRF {x 0 ,x 1 } . The adversary is given (x 0 , x 1 , PRF {x 0 ,x 1 } ) and outputs a bit b . Notice that in this game, we have assured that every y ∈ [n] has a preimage under PRF. We need this condition to make the next step of sampling random preimages well defined. Technically, it would suffice to have a preimage only for y b 0 and y b 1 , but for simplicity we will assume that every possible output has a preimage. When f : [m] → [n] is a random function, the probability that some output has no preimage is at most n · exp(−Ω(m/n)) which is negligible when m = ω(n log(n)). Since m, n are assumed to be a polynomial in the security parameter, we can efficiently check if every output has a preimage, thus if PRF is pseudorandom it must also be the case that every output has a preimage with high probability. Since we can efficiently check whether or not every output has a preimage under PRF, and this event occurs with all but negligible probability, we can efficiently sample the pseudorandom function in the first step of InputMatching[y 0 , y 1 ]. 
In Section A we will show that input-matching secure twice puncturable pseudorandom functions exist with suitable parameters. 
Indistinguishability Obfuscation
We use the following formulation of Garg et al. [GGH + 13] for indistinguishability obfuscation:
Definition 5.5 (Indistinguishability Obfuscation). A indistinguishability obfuscator O for a circuit class {C λ } is a probabilistic polynomial-time uniform algorithm satisfying the following conditions:
1. O(λ, C) preserves the functionality of C. That is, for any C ∈ C λ , if we compute
2. For any λ and any two circuits C 0 , C 1 with the same functionality, the circuits O(λ, C 0 ) and O(λ, C 1 ) are indistinguishable. More precisely, for all pairs of probabilistic polynomialtime adversaries (Samp, D), if
The circuit classes we are interested in are polynomial-size circuits -that is, when C λ is the collection of all circuits of size at most λ.
When clear from context, we will often drop λ as an input to O and as a subscript for C.
A Weak Traitor-Tracing Scheme with Very Short Ciphertexts
In this section we construct a traitor-tracing scheme for n users where the key length is polynomial in the security parameter λ and the ciphertext length is only O(log(n)). This scheme will be used to establish our hardness result for differential privacy when the data universe can be exponentially large but the family of queries has only polynomial size.
Construction
Let n = poly(λ) denote the number of users for the scheme. Let m =Õ(n 7 ) be a parameter. Our construction will rely on the following primitives:
• A pseudorandom generator PRG : {0, 1} λ/2 → {0, 1} λ .
• A puncturable pseudorandom function family F λ,sk = PRF sk : [n] → {0, 1} λ .
• A twice-puncturable pseudorandom function family
• An iO scheme Obfuscate.
Let each user's secret key be sk i = (i, s i , O) Let the master key be mk = PRF Enc .
Enc(j, mk = PRF Enc ) :
Let c be chosen uniformly from PRF −1
Enc (j). Output c.
Dec(sk i = (i, s i , O), c):
Output O(c, i, s i ). 
Parameters
First we verify that Π short−ctext is an (n, d, )-traitor-tracing scheme for the desired parameters. Observe that the length of the secret keys is log(n)+λ+|O|. By the efficiency of the pseudorandom functions and the specification of P, the running time of P is poly(λ + log(n)). Thus, by the efficiency of Obfuscate, |O| = poly(λ + log(n)). Therefore the total key length is poly(λ + log(n)). Since n is assumed to be a polynomial in λ, we have that the secret keys have length d = poly(λ) as desired. By construction, the ciphertext is an element of [m]. Thus, since m =Õ(n 7 ) the ciphertexts length satisfies 2 =Õ(n 7 ) as desired.
Proof of Weak Index-Hiding Security
In light of Lemma 3.4, in order to prove that the scheme satisfies weak index-hiding security, it suffices to show that for every sufficiently large λ ∈ N, and every i * ∈ [n(λ)],
We will demonstrate this using a series of hybrids to reduce security of the scheme in the TwoIndexHiding game to input-matching security of the pseudorandom function family PRF λ,Enc . Before we proceed with the argument, we remark a bit on how we will present the hybrids. Note that the view of the adversary consists of the keys sk −i * . Each of these keys is of the form (i, s i , O) where O is an obfuscation of the same program P. Thus, for brevity, we will discuss only how we modify the construction of the program P and it will be understood that each user's key will consist of an obfuscation of this modified program. We will also rely crucially on the fact that, because the challenge ciphertexts depend only on the master key mk, we can generate the challenge ciphertexts c 0 and c 1 can be generated before the users' secret keys sk 1 , . . . , sk n . Thus, we will be justified when we modify P in a manner that depends on the challenge ciphertexts and include an obfuscation of this program in the users' secret keys. We also remark that we highlight the changes in the hybrids in green.
Breaking the decryption program for challenge index
We use a series of hybrids to ensure that the obfuscated program reveals no information about the secret s i * for the specified user i * . First, we modify the program by hardcoding the secret s i * into the program. The obfuscated versions of P and P 1 are indistinguishable because the input-output behavior of the programs are identical, thus the indistinguishability obfuscation guarantees that the obfuscations of these programs are computationally indistinguishable.
Next we modify the setup procedure to give a uniformly random value for s i * . The new setup procedure is indistinguishable from the original setup procedure by the pseudorandomness of s i * = PRF sk (i * ). Finally, we modify the decryption program to use a truly random value x * instead of x * = PRG(PRF sk (i * )). The new decryption program is indistinguishable from the original by pseudorandomness of PRG and PRF sk .
After making these modifications, with probability at least 1 − 2 −λ/2 , the random value x * is not in the image of PRG. Thus, with probability at least 1 − 2 −λ/2 , the condition PRG(sk) = x * will be unsatisfiable. Therefore, we can simply remove this test without changing the program on any inputs. Thus, the obfuscation of P 1 will be indistinguishable from the obfuscation of the following program P 2 .
Breaking the decryption program for the challenge ciphertexts 
Reducing to Input-Matching Security
Finally, we claim that if the adversary is able to win at TwoIndexHiding then he can also win the game InputMatching[i * − 1, i * ], which violates input-matching security of F λ,Enc .
Recall that the challenge in the game InputMatching to the adversary. Then we can user c 0 , c 1 as the challenge ciphertexts and obtain a bit b from the adversary. By input-matching security, we have that
Since, as we argued above, the view of the adversary in this game is indistinguishable from the view of the adversary in TwoIndexHiding[i * ], we conclude that
as desired. This completes the proof.
A Weak Traitor-Tracing Scheme with Very Short Keys
In this section we construct a different traitor-tracing scheme for n users where the parameters are essentially reversed-the length of the secret user keys is O(log(n)) and the length of the ciphertexts is poly(λ). This scheme will be used to establish our hardness result for differential privacy when the number of queries is exponentially large but the data universe has only polynomial size.
Construction
Let n = poly(λ) denote the number of users for the scheme. Let m =Õ(n 6 ) be a parameter. Our construction will rely on the following primitives:
• A puncturable pseudorandom function family
Theorem 7.1. Assuming the existence of one-way functions and indistinguishability obfuscation, for every polynomial n, the scheme Π short−key is an (n, d, )-traitor-tracing scheme for 2 d =Õ(n 7 ) and = poly(λ), and is weakly index-hiding secure.
Combining this theorem with Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 4.1 establishes Theorem 1.2 in the introduction.
Parameters
First we verify that Π short−key is an (n, d, )-traitor-tracing scheme for the desired parameters. Observe that the length of the secret keys is d such that 2 d = nm. By construction, since m =Õ(n 6 ), 2 d =Õ(n 7 ). The length of the ciphertext is |O|, which is poly(|P|) by the efficiency of the obfuscation scheme. By the efficiency of the pseudorandom function family and the pairwise independent hash family, the running time of P is at most poly(λ + log(n)). Since n is assumed to be a polynomial in λ, the ciphertexts have length poly(λ).
Setup(λ) :
Choose a pseudorandom function PRF sk ← R F λ,sk . For i = 1, . . . , n, let s i = PRF sk (i), and let each user's secret key be
Let the master key be mk = PRF sk .
Figure 10: Our scheme Π short−key
Proof of Weak Index-Hiding Security
Just as in Section 6, we will rely on Lemma 3.4 so that we only need to show that for every λ ∈ N, and every i * ∈ [n(λ)],
We will demonstrate this using a series of hybrids to reduce security of the scheme in the TwoIndexHiding game to the security of the pseudorandom function families. In our argument, recall that the adversary's view consists of the keys sk −i * and the challenge ciphertexts c 0 , c 1 . In our proof, we will not modify how the keys are generated, so we will present the hybrids only by how the challenge ciphertexts are generated. Also, for simplicity, we will focus only on how c 0 is generated as a function of i * , b 0 and mk. The ciphertext c 1 will be generated in exactly the same way but as a function of i * , b 1 and mk. We also remark that we highlight the changes in the hybrids in green.
Hiding the missing user key
First we modify the encryption procedure to one where PRF sk is punctured on i * and the value s * = PRF sk (i * ) is hardcoded into the program.
We claim that, by the security of the iO scheme, the distribution of c 0 , c 1 under Enc 1 is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of c 0 , c 1 under Enc. The reason is that the obfuscation P and P 1 compute the same function. Consider two cases, depending on whether i = i * or i i * . If i i * , since b 0 ∈ {0, 1}, and i i * , replacing I{i ≤ i * − b 0 } with I{i ≤ i * − 1} does not change the output. Moreover, since we only reach the branch involving PRF {i * } sk when i i * , the puncturing does not affect the output of the program. If i = i * , then the program either outputs PRF Enc (i * , s) as it did before when s s * or it outputs 1 − b 0 : equivalent to I{i ≤ i * − b 0 }. Thus, by iO, the obfuscated programs are indistinguishable. Next, we argue that, since PRF {i * } sk is sampled from a puncturable pseudorandom function family, and the adversary's view consists of s −i * = {PRF sk (i)} i i * but not PRF sk (i * ), the value of PRF sk (i * ) is computationally indistinguishable to the adversary from a random value. Thus, we can move to another hybrid (Enc 2 , P 2 ) where the value s * is replaced with a uniformly random values. Hiding the challenge index Now we want to remove any explicit use of b 0 from P 2 . The natural way to try to do this is to remove the line where the program outputs 1 − b 0 when the input is (i * ,s), and instead have the program output PRF Enc (i * ,s). However, this would involve changing the program's output on one input, and indistinguishability obfuscation does not guarantee any security in this case. We get around this problem in two steps. First, we note that the value of PRF Enc on the point (i * ,s) is never needed in P 2 , so we can move to a new procedure P 3 where we puncture at that point without changing the program functionality. Indistinguishability obfuscation guarantees that P 2 and P 3 are computationally indistinguishable. Next, we define another hybrid P 4 where change how we sample PRF Enc and sample it so that PRF Enc (i * ,s) = 1 − b 0 . Observe that the hybrid only depends on PRF
We claim the distributions of PRF
when PRF Enc is sampled correctly versus sampled conditioned on PRF Enc (i * ,s) = 1−b 0 are computationally indistinguishable. This follows readily from punctured PRF security. Suppose to the contrary that the two distributions were distinguishable with non-negligible advantage δ by adversary A. Then consider a punctured PRF adversary B that is given PRF Thus, changing how PRF Enc is sampled is computationally undetectable, and P is otherwise unchanged. Therefore P 3 and P 4 are computationally indistinguishable.
Output c 0 = O. Next, since PRF Enc (i * ,s) = 1 − b 0 , we can move to another hybrid P 5 where we delete the line "If s =s, output 1 − b 0 " without changing the functionality. Thus, by indistinguishability obfuscation, P 4 and P 5 are computationally indistinguishable. Now notice that P 5 is independent of b 0 . However, Enc 5 still depends on b 0 . We now move to the final hybrid P 6 where we remove the condition that PRF Enc (i * ,s) = 1 − b 0 , which will completely remove the dependence on b 0 .
To prove that Enc 6 is indistinguishable from Enc 5 , notice that they are independent ofs, except through the sampling of PRF Enc . Using this, and the following lemma, we argue that we can remove the condition that PRF Enc (i * ,s) = 1 − b 0 . • D 1 : Choose h ← R H.
• D 2 : Choose a random x ∈ M, and then choose h ← R (H | h(x) = y).
We defer the proof to Section 7.3. The natural way to try to show that (Enc 6 , P 6 ) is o(1/n 3 ) statistically close to (Enc 5 , P 5 ) is to apply this lemma to the hash family H = F λ,Enc . Recall that a pseudorandom function family is also negl(λ)-pairwise independent. Here, the parameters , and these share the sames. Hence, we cannot directly invoke Lemma 7.2 on the PRF Enc,0 sampled in c 0 , sinces is also used to sample PRF Enc,1 when sampling c 1 , and is therefore not guaranteed to be random given c 1 .
Instead, we actually consider the function family H = F 2 λ,Enc , where we define
In Enc 5 , h is drawn at random conditioned on h(i * ,s) = (1−b 0 , 1−b 1 ), whereas in Enc 6 , it is drawn at random.
H is still a pseudorandom function family, so it must be negl(λ)-almost pairwise independent with δ negligible. In particular, δ = o(1/m). Hence, the conditions of Lemma 7.2 are satisfied with K = 4. Since the description of P 5 , P 6 is the tuple (i * ,s, PRF {i * } sk , PRF Enc,0 , PRF Enc,1 ), and by Lemma 7.2 the distribution on these tuples differs by at most O( √ 1/m) in statistical distance, we also have that the distribution on obfuscations of P 5 , P 6 differs by at most O( √ 1/m). Finally, we can choose a value of m =Õ(n 6 ) so that O(
. Observe that when we generate user keys sk −i * and the challenge ciphertexts according to (Enc 6 , P 6 ), the distribution of the adversary's view is completely independent of the random values b 0 , b 1 . Thus no adversary can output b = b 0 ⊕ b 1 with probability greater than 1/2. Since the distribution of these challenge ciphertexts is o(1/n 3 )-computationally indistinguishable from the original distribution on challenge ciphertexts, we have that for every computationally efficient adversary,
Proof of Lemma 7.2
We will fix y = 1 for simplicity. The cases of y = 2, . . . , K follow symmetrically. We will first bound the Rényi divergence between D 1 and D 2 , which is defined as
Here, h ranges over the support of D 2 (since the support of D 2 is a subset of H, we can equivalently view the sum as one over all h in H). Once we do this, we will obtain an upper bound on the statistical distance between D 1 and D 2 using the inequality
To bound the Rényi divergence, we can start by writing
Where in all the (conditional) probabilities on the right, h is drawn from D 1 , conditioned on some event. This allows us to write
We now divide the sum into two cases.
• x = x . In this case, the summand becomes
Therefore, the summand is
. Thus, if we carry out the sum over h, the summand becomes 1/P [H(x) = 1].
• x x . Then
When we take the product of the two expressions and expand, we obtain four products, only one of which is nonzero (when h(x) = h(x ) = 1):
When we sum over all h, we get
Therefore, the Rényi divergence is
We now invoke δ-almost pairwise independence to claim that
Therefore, for δ ≤ 1/2K, it is easy to show that 1/P [H(x) = 1] ≤ 2 + 2K 2 δ and
So we have that
Using the relationship between statistical distance and Rényi divergence above (Equation (9)), we obtain SD(D 1 , D 2 ) ≤ 1 2 (K − 1)/m + 7K 2 δ, as long as δ < 1/2k. Notice that for δ ≥ 1/2K, 7K 2 δ ≥ 7, and so our bound is larger than 1 anyway. Hence, the bound holds for all δ.
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A Twice Puncturable Pseudorandom Functions
A.1 An Input-Matching Secure PRF
Like pseudorandom functions satisfying the existing notions of puncturing, our construction is simply the GGM PRF family. We detail this constraint for notational purposes. For simplicity, we assume that m and n are powers of 2. We now claim that the GGM construction satisfies Theorem 5.4. We start by modifying the InputMatching game to one that will make it easier to prove security. Consider the following pair of games.
• Game0: The InputMatching[y 0 , y 1 ] game above. The proof is an uninsightful computation, so we will defer it to Section A.1.1. Now we want to prove that the b 0 ⊕b 1 = 0 and b 0 ⊕b 1 = 1 cases of Game1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Claim A.3.
To show this, we need the following lemma: 
Let s j be the seed of the first node which is an ancestor of x and not an ancestor of x 0 , x 1 but it parent is. Let j be its height in the binary tree. Let z = P RG x µ (P RG x µ−1 (. . . (P RG x j+1 (P RG x j (s j ))) . . . )) Let y be the first log 2 (n) bits of z and output y • z where z is chosen at random from {0, 1} 2λ conditioned on p(z) = 1. Proof sketch of Claim A.3. Consider the GGM tree, and the punctured function PRF {x 0 ,x 1 } consisting of the values at all nodes in the tree that are not an ancestor of x 0 or x 1 , but whose parent is an ancestor. We now consider the following procedure 1. Pick a node whose value s is random (perhaps conditioned on some predicate p on PRG(s)),
and not derived from another node's value. For example, at the beginning this is the root node, which is random, conditioned on the leaves at x 0 and x 1 having values y b 0 , y b 1 .
2. If that node is part of the punctured key PRF {x 0 ,x 1 } or is one of the leaves at x 0 , x 1 , don't do anything to this node.
3. Otherwise, delete that node, and replace the values of the children with random, conditioned on the predicate p being 1. This predicate is applied to the concatenation of the children's values. Notice that, given the form of our initial predicate each of the children's new values s 0 , s 1 will be independently random, perhaps conditioned on some predicates p 0 , p 1 on PRG(s 0 ), PRG(s 1 ) respectively.
We iterate the procedure until we no longer make any changes to the tree. By applying Lemma A.4 to the change made in step 3, we can see that the distributions on the punctured PRF before and after we apply the procedure are ε-computationally indistinguishable for ε = negl(λ).
In the end, we will have changed all of the punctured key values to uniformly random. Note that, since these nodes are not ancestors of x 0 , x 1 , the predicate on them is trivially satisfied, so they are uniformly random even conditioned on the values of the function at x 0 , x 1 . Thus, these values are also independent of the output of the function at the points x 0 , x 1 . Thus, as long as x 0 x 1 we can swap these values to any combination of y b 0 and y b 1 . Since the probability that x 0 = x 1 is at most 1/m, the probability that the adversary can Observe that these tuples contain strictly more information than the challenges given to the adversary in Game0 and Game1, respectively. That is, the challenges can be generated by applying a function to these tuples, which cannot increase the statistical distance between the two distributions. Thus, to prove Claim A.2 it suffices to prove that these two distributions are statistically close. First, we switch to an intermediate game Game0A in which the function PRF is not required to have a preimage for every y ∈ [n]. To make the sampling procedure well defined, if y b 0 or y b 1 does not have a preimage under PRF, we simply choose x 0 and x 1 to be ⊥.
Lemma A.5. If PRF is pseudorandom and m, n are polynomials, then Game0 and Game0A are ε-statistically indistinguishable for ε = n · exp(−Ω(m/n)) + negl(λ).
Proof. Suppose that f : [m] → [n] is a uniformly random function. Then a simple calculation shows that the probability that there exists y ∈ [n] such that PRF −1 (y) = ∅ is at most n · (1 − 1/n) m = n · exp(−Ω(m/n)).
Since m, n are polynomial in the security parameter λ, there is a polynomial time algorithm that checks whether a function PRF : [m] → [n] has at least one preimage for every y ∈ [n]. Thus, if PRF is sampled from a pseudorandom function family, it must also be true that the probability that there exists y ∈ [n] such that PRF −1 (y) = ∅ is at most n · exp(−Ω(m/n)) + negl(λ), or else there would be an efficient algorithm that distinguishes a random function PRF from a truly random function f . Since conditioning on an event that occurs with probability at least 1 − p can only affect the distribution by at most p in statistical distance, we conclude that the two distributions are statistically indistinguishable to within n · exp(−Ω(m/n)) + negl(λ). Now, we introduce a second intermediate game Game0B in which we first choose a random value x 0 ∈ [m], then sample PRF such that PRF(x 0 ) = y b 0 , and finally we choose x 1 to be a random preimage of y b 1 . If y b 1 has no preimage under PRF, we set x 1 = ⊥.
Lemma A.6. If PRF is pseudorandom and m, n are polynomials, then Game0A and Game0B are ε-statistically indistinguishable for ε =Õ( √ n/m).
Before proving the lemma, we will state and prove a useful combinatorial lemma about conditioning a pseudorandom function on a single input-output pair. Consider the following two ways of sampling a pseudorandom function. . We will argue later why using a pseudorandom function cannot increase the statistical distance between the two distributions by more than negl(λ). Now, observe that in both experiments, the marginal distribution on x is uniform on [m]. Also, observe that for every fixed choice of x and s, the conditional distribution f |x, s in each experiment is the same. Finally, note that the distribution on s is independent of x in each experiment. Thus, in order to bound the statistical distance between the two experiments, it suffices to bound the statistical distance between the marginal distributions of s in the two experiments.
In ExpA, the probability that |f −1 (y)| = s is precisely the probability that y has exactly s preimages in a random function f : 
